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Abstract—Missile seekers are becoming increasingly more ca-
pable of using Doppler Beam Sharpening (DBS) modes as part of
the homing cycle. This paper develops jamming theory and uses it
for practical implementation of inserting false targets into a DBS
image. The theory is also developed for how incorrect estimations
of the seeker trajectory can affect the quality and location of the
false target. The simulated and experimental results show how
received missile seeker waveforms can be modified to create false
targets at desired locations.
I. INTRODUCTION
Doppler Beam Sharpening (DBS) is a technique that uses
the changing Doppler caused by relative motion between a
platform and a target, to synthetically narrow the main beam
of the radar. Due to the constraints of the missile, seeker
antennas are relatively small and therefore have wider beams
and larger cross-range resolutions than desired. Missile seekers
benefit from using DBS, as it improves cross-range resolu-
tion without being computationally expensive like Synthetic
Aperture Radars (SAR) and DBS images are generally much
faster to obtain than SAR. As a generic example, DBS can
be performed with a dwell time in the order of tens of
milliseconds, whereas SAR is in the order of whole seconds
[1].
The use of DBS for missile homing gives rise to the require-
ment for countermeasures against this mode. In order for a
jammer to create a false target at a desired location within the
seeker DBS image and with the correct focus, the jammer
must create a synthetic phase history to mimic the phase
history a target would have if it was at that location. This
requires knowledge of the missile trajectory as well as the
ability to coherently modify the seeker waveform. The jammer
also needs to detect that the seeker is performing DBS and not
using another mode for identifying targets. Detecting when a
seeker would use DBS is beyond the scope of this paper, but
the work set out in [2], [3] and [4], suggests that there is an
optimal and specific trajectory that the missile could use to
perform DBS. Prior knowledge of these types of trajectories
could enable the jammer to detect that the seeker is using the
DBS mode.
The ability to create high fidelity copies of waveforms and
modify them comes from the use of Digital Radio Frequency
Memory (DRFM) systems. A DRFM can store and modify
waveforms using high-speed sampling and digital memory [5].
The DRFM enables phase coherency which enables coherent
radar modes to be jammed such as by creating false targets
in SAR images [6]. There is very little literature on jamming
DBS modes, but previous work in [7] introduced the concept
of creating false targets in DBS images of a missile seeker.
However, it did not explain how errors are induced by incor-
rect position and velocity estimations, nor did it discuss the
practical implementations of waveform modification.
II. DBS THEORY AND SCENARIO
The achievable range and cross-range resolution of a DBS
radar is essentially determined by the bandwidth of the
transmitted waveform and the dwell time of the Coherent
Processing Interval (CPI). Pulse compression waveforms such
as Linear Frequency Modulation (LFM) or Stepped Frequency
increase the effective bandwidth of the pulse and increase
range resolution capabilities. The theoretical Doppler resolu-
tion of a DBS radar is the inverse of the dwell time (δfd =
1
Td
).
Azimuth “compression” is achieved by taking the Fourier
transform across each range bin.
The range profiles of the targets can be found by the cross-
correlation function between the received signal sr(t) and the
transmitted pulse, st(t) as
sMF (t) = st(t) ∗ sr(t) =
∫
∞
∞
s∗t (τ − t)sr(τ)dτ (1)
The Doppler history of the targets can then be found by taking
the Fourier Transform across the pulses for each range bin t0
as
S(t0, f) =
M−1∑
m=1
sMF (t0 +mPRI)e
−i2πfmPRI (2)
where PRI is the Pulse Repetition Interval. If the trajectory
of the missile is linear during one CPI of the radar and has no
acceleration in any direction, the velocity vector of the missile
in 3D will be
~v = V
[
cos(γ) cos(χ)ˆi+ cos(γ) sin(χ)jˆ + sin(γ)kˆ
]
(3)
Where V is the missile speed and γ and χ are the missile
headings in elevation and azimuth, respectively. Assuming
~r(0) = 0, this means the position vector of the missile as
a function of time would be
~r(t) =
∫
~vdt
= V t
[
cos(γ) cos(χ)ˆi+ cos(γ) sin(χ)jˆ + sin(γ)kˆ
] (4)
For simplicity and ease of presentation, we consider the 2D
scenario for the remainder of the paper. We also assume a
perpendicular trajectory and no range migration in the images
where both γ and χ = 0◦.
Fig. 1. Missile Reference Frame
From Figure 1, the position vector of a stationary target (the
ship) ~T is given by
~T = x0iˆ+R0jˆ (5)
where x0 and R0 are the cross-range and downrange positions
from the missile. If the missile trajectory is such that it is
moving closer to the target, the resultant range to go vector,
−→rT (t), is therefore
−→rT (t) = ~T − ~r(t) = (x0 − V t) iˆ+R0jˆ (6)
If the range between the seeker and the target is
‖−→rT (t)‖ =
√
(x0 − V t)
2
+R0
2 = RT (t) (7)
then the time delay of the echo from the target is
τ(t) =
2‖−→rT (t)‖
c
=
2
√
(x0 − V t)
2
+R0
2
c
(8)
We study the quantity
√
R0
2 + (x0 − V t )
2
= R0
(
1 +
x0
2
R0
2 −
2V tx0
R0
2 +
(V t)
2
R0
2
) 1
2
(9)
When R0 >> x0,
x0
2
R0
2 and
(V t)2
R0
2 can be approximated to
zero. This means Eq. (9) can be simplified to
R0
(
1 +
x0
2
R0
2 −
2V tx0
R0
2 +
(V t)
2
R0
2
) 1
2
≃ R0
(
1−
2V tx0
R0
2
) 1
2
(10)
By taking the first order Taylor approximation of Eq. (10), the
time delay in Eq. (8) can be expressed as
τ(t) =
2R0
c
−
2V x0t
cR0
=
2R0
c
−
2βt
c
(11)
with β = V x0
R0
. An arbitrary waveform, transmitted and then
received by the seeker from an echo reflected from a target is
sR(t) = x(t− τ(t))e
i2πfc(t−τ(t)) (12)
where fc is the carrier frequency of the transmitted wave. The
received signal after down-conversion will be
sR(t) = x
(
t−
2R0
c
)
e−i2πfc(
2R0
c
−
2βt
c ) (13)
Then the instantaneous frequency of that waveform is
defined as the time derivative of the phase divided by 2π
fIF =
1
2π
d
[
−2πfc
(
2R0
c
− 2V tx0
cR0
)]
dt
(14)
=
− 2fc
c
d
[
R0 −
V tx0
R0
]
dt
(15)
This means that the Doppler shift for a target at the position
in Eq. (5) would be
fd =
2V x0
λR0
(16)
The seeker measures the range and the Doppler shift and
then inverts Eq. (16) to obtain the cross-range position x0.
III. JAMMING THEORY AND METHOD
A. Theory
We now study the case of a self-protection jammer and for
the scenario in Figure 1, the jammer is physically located on
the ship. Instead of a target reflecting a received signal like in
the previous section, this section includes an additional step.
The jammer intercepts the transmitted seeker waveform and
then both delays and modifies that waveform, following the
scheme in Figure 2.
Fig. 2. Jamming Block Diagram
The block diagram in Figure 2 shows that the jammer would
receive the signal s2(t) which is a delayed version of s1(t).
The jammer would then delay s2(t) to give an additive range
component and modify the waveform to change the Doppler
profile of the target. Let τj be the additive jammer delay and
α the modifying Doppler shift applied to the waveform. After
downmixing, narrowband and previous approximations
s4(t) = x
(
t−
2R0
c
− τj
)
ei2πfc
2β
c
te−i2πfc[
2R0
c
+τj]ei2πfcαt
(17)
In order for the jammer to create the perfect false target at
the range R0 + δR and cross-range x0 + δx, the value of τj
and α must be such that the result at the seeker would be
s4(t) = x
(
t−
2(R0 + δR)
c
)
ei2πfc
2βJ
c
te−i2πfc
2(R0+δR)
c
(18)
where
βJ =
V (x0 + δx)
(R0 + δR)
(19)
The additional down and cross ranges added to make βJ
different to β, are used to show that an ideal jamming point
target would look exactly like an echo received if a target was
at the positions of (x0 + δx) and (R0 + δR) in the x and y
axes respectively. This means that
ei2πfc
2βt
c ei2πfcαt = ei2πfc
2βJt
c (20)
and
α =
2βJ
c
−
2β
c
=
2V
c
[
(x0 + δx)
(R0 + δR)
−
x0
R0
]
(21)
This means that the signal received at the seeker would be
s4(t) = x
(
t−
2R0
c
− τj
)
ei2πfc
2βt
c
× e−i2πfc(
2R0
c
+τj)e
i2πfc
(
2βJ
c
−
2β
c
)
t
(22)
Where τj =
2δR
c
and δR is the additive miss distance in
downrange for the false target. Table I gives the seeker
position variables and the additional false target positions for
an example scenario.
TABLE I
EXAMPLE SCENARIO VARIABLES
Variable Seeker False Target Miss Distance
Down-range (km) 24 24.4 0.4
Cross-range (km) 0.5 0.7 0.2
The constant
2(δR)
c
can be considered to be the additive
range component and the term
V t(x0+δx)
(R0+δR)
− V tx0
R0
is the phase
component which will give the Doppler history and therefore
determine the cross-range position of the false target. This
approximation holds providing that there is no range migration
during a CPI.
For a pulsed radar using Linear Frequency Modulated (LFM)
waveforms, the transmitted pulse would be
x(t) =
M−1∑
m=0
sT (t−mPRI)e
i2πfct (23)
sT (t) = Rect
(
t
τ
)
eiπγt
2
(24)
Rect
(
t
τ
)
=
{
1, 0 < t < τ
0, Elsewhere
}
(25)
This means that after down-conversion, the seeker would
receive
sR(t) =
M−1∑
m=0
sT
(
t−mPRI−
2R0
c
− τj
)
ei2πfc
2βt
c
× e−i2πfc(
2R0
c
+τj)ei2πfcαt
(26)
The time domain is now sampled in a fast-slow time form
where t = nTs+ kPRI with n = 0, .., N − 1 where N are the
number of range bins (NTs = PRI) and k = 0, ..,M − 1. If
t0 = nTs, the received signal becomes
sR(t0 + kPRI) =
M−1∑
m=0
sT
(
t0 + (k −m)PRI−
2R0
c
− τj
)
× ei2πfc
2β
c
t0ei2πfc
2β
c
kPRIe−i2πfc(
2R0
c
+τj)
× ei2πfcαt0ei2πfcαkPRI
(27)
Using the above equations, positions in Table I and the
signal variables in Table II, Figure 3 demonstrates that a false
target at a different cross-range position to the jammer can be
induced into the seeker DBS image by incrementally applying
a phase shift to the received seeker waveform.
TABLE II
SIMULATION WAVEFORM VARIABLES
Variable Symbol Value
Carrier Frequency fc 36GHz
Bandwidth B 40MHz
Pulse Width τ 3µs
Pulse Repetition Frequency PRF 10kHz
B. Erroneous Trajectory Estimation
For the jammer to accurately place a false target at the
desired location, it requires knowledge of the seeker position
and velocity. Each variable in the time delay equation can be
incorrectly estimated by varying amounts. Incorporating these
errors into in Eq. (21) gives
αǫ =
2
c
[
VǫV (xǫx0 + δx)
(RǫR0 + δR)
−
VǫV xǫx0
RǫR0
]
(28)
The scalar variables xǫ, Rǫ and Vǫ are the numerical ratio
between the estimated value of the variable and the true
value for cross-range, downrange and velocity respectively.
Fig. 3. Induced False Target
For example, if the true velocity of the missile is 300ms−1 but
the jammer estimates it to be 360ms−1, then Vǫ =
Vj
V
= 1.2.
Incorporating this into the signal model, the resultant signal
would be
s4(t) = x
(
t−
2R0
c
− τj
)
ei2πfc
2βt
c
× e−i2πfc(
2R0
c
+τj)e
i2πfct
2VǫV
c
[
xǫx0+δx
RǫR0+δR
−
xǫx0
RǫR0
] (29)
If there were no errors in the missile trajectory, this would
simplify to Eq. (18). By using Eq. (14) to find the instantaneos
frequency and therefore cross-range of the false target, it will
be seen that the intended Doppler and therefore cross-range
position of the target will be shifted, depending on the error.
Using the same scenario as for Figure 3 but with Vǫ
set to 1.2, Figure 4 shows how the position of the false
target will be shifted in cross-range. When trying to replicate
a complex target with multiple scattering points, this will
severely degrade the false target quality.
IV. PRACTICALLY MODIFYING A WAVEFORM
Using the techniques in the previous sections with a Uni-
versal Software Radio Peripheral (USRP), a false target was
induced into an image at a desired cross-range position of
3m. With the experiment using the USRP, there was no real
movement of the antennas, only a constant delay caused by
the separation of the two antennas. The target at 3m cross-
range was induced by applying an incremental shift to each
transmitted pulse by using an assumed missile velocity. This
experiment was carried out using a Linear Frequency Modu-
lated (LFM) waveform as per the simulated scenario in Figure
3. The variables used in the measurement are shown in Table
III and the USRP used was a National Instruments NI 2943R.
The USRP was controlled using LabVIEW and embedded
Matlab software designed the waveforms used. No additional
miss distance in downrange was added in this experiment,
Fig. 4. Shifted False Target with Velocity Magnitude Error
so the quantity δR is zero. As there was no real movement
of the antennas, the quantity β was also zero. Therefore, the
transmitted waveform was modified to
x(t) =
M−1∑
m=0
sT (t−mPRI) e
i2πfctei2πfcαt (30)
and the received waveform after down-conversion was
sR(t0 + kPRI) =
M−1∑
m=0
sT
(
t0 + (k −m)PRI−
R0
c
)
× e−i2πfc
R0
c e−i2πfcα
R0
c ei2πfcαt0ei2πfcαkPRI
(31)
Where for this measurement,
α =
2βJ
c
=
2V δx
cR0
(32)
sT (t) = Rect
(
t
τ
)
eiπγt
2
(33)
Rect
(
t
τ
)
=
{
1, 0 < t < τ
0, Elsewhere
}
(34)
TABLE III
USRP VARIABLES
Variable Symbol Value
Carrier Frequency fc 4GHz
Bandwidth B 40MHz
Pulse Width τ 10µs
Sampling Rate Fs 80M
Assumed Missile Velocity Vm 100ms
−1
Pulse Repetition Interval PRI 50µs
Number of Pulses M 128
Time Delay td
5
c
Fig. 5. USRP Set-Up
Figure 5 shows the set-up in the laboratory and Figures 6,
7 and 8 show the results of attempting to induce a false target
at 3m in cross-range. The ranges and cross-ranges were scaled
down for the laboratory, but the method would be the same as
shown in the simulation of Figure 3. These figures demonstrate
that a false target can be generated at the desired location
within a DBS image, providing that the seeker trajectory is
known and the carrier frequency and waveform have been
estimated correctly.
These measurements were performed for a completely
known/assumed trajectory and the next step is to change
the experimental set-up to incorporate real movement of the
antennas in accordance with the movement of the missile
during one CPI.
Fig. 6. Range Profile of False Target
V. CONCLUSION
A theory of how a jammer can modify a received waveform
is presented. The simulations and experiments with the USRP
show that waveforms can be sufficiently modified to induce
false targets into DBS images at the desired location with
relatively inexpensive hardware. With inexpensive hardware,
Fig. 7. Cross-Range Profile of False Target
Fig. 8. Induced False Target
the difficulty comes in rapidly creating a digital copy of the
received waveform in order to modify it as well as estimating
the missile trajectory.
The developed theory incorporates the errors that will be
induced into the position and quality of the false target
when the missile (or other platform) trajectory is incorrectly
estimated. In practice, tracking the missile trajectory is difficult
and errors in tracking will degrade the quality of the induced
false targets. Erroneous trajectory estimations will shift the
position of the target to an undesired location and also cause
it to lose focus in the image.
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